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Ranking is a ubiquitous phenomenon in the human society. By clicking the web pages of Forbes,
you may find all kinds of rankings, such as world’s most powerful people, world’s richest people,
top-paid tennis stars, and so on and so forth. Herewith, we study a specific kind, sports ranking
systems in which players’ scores and prize money are calculated based on their performances in
attending various tournaments. A typical example is tennis. It is found that the distributions of
both scores and prize money follow universal power laws, with exponents nearly identical for most
sports fields. In order to understand the origin of this universal scaling we focus on the tennis
ranking systems. By checking the data we find that, for any pair of players, the probability that
the higher-ranked player will top the lower-ranked opponent is proportional to the rank difference
between the pair. Such a dependence can be well fitted to a sigmoidal function. By using this
feature, we propose a simple toy model which can simulate the competition of players in different
tournaments. The simulations yield results consistent with the empirical findings. Extensive studies
indicate the model is robust with respect to the modifications of the minor parts.
PACS numbers: 89.75.Da, 01.80.+b, 05.10.-a.
I. INTRODUCTION
Most systems in nature have been perceived as a col-
lection of a huge amount of highly interacting units. Al-
though equipped with different components and inter-
actions, different systems could still possess some com-
monly shared characteristics. Through analyzing the sta-
tistical distributions of varieties of empirical quantities,
two main patterns of distributions [1] have been found.
For the first one, there is a typical value, around which
most quantities distribute tightly clustered [2], or that is
to say, such pattern of distributions are peaked around
this typical value. Representative examples include the
height of human beings, the speed of cars on the mo-
torway, the intelligence quotient (IQ) test of people, etc.
In the traditional IQ test for adults, most people (about
69% of the population) would score in the average range
(85-114), a small number (about 26% of the population)
would score moderately below average (70-84) and mod-
erately above average (115-129), very high (130 or higher)
and very low (below 70) are extremely rare (about 5% of
the population).
However, not all quantities could be well character-
ized by their average values, some would change over an
enormous dynamic range, sometimes even many orders
of magnitude. Such pattern has absolutely long been fa-
miliar with, in the studies regarding the distributions of
people’s annual incomes [3], word frequencies in text [4],
and city sizes [5]. For the city sizes distribution, if cities
are ranked by their population from the largest (rank
1) to the smallest (rank N), it is immediately discovered
that, only a small number of cities possess the large pop-
ulation, the majority of cities have the small population.
Relationship between rank and city sizes has been found
to follow ln rank = α + β ln size, with the slope of the
curve β being close to -1, which has been well known as
Zipf ’s law.
A more general expression of such pattern is the power
law distribution, with p(x) = Ax−β , A = eα, and x is the
observation of the system. Power law distributions have
been considerably widely observed in nature, such as the
net worth of the richest individuals in the US [2], the fre-
quencies of occurrence of words in most human languages
[2, 4, 5], the frequencies of family names in most cultures
[6], the number of calls received by customs [7, 8], the
number of bytes of data received from computer users [9],
the number of hits on the web sites [10], the number of
links to web sites [11], the number of citations received
by papers [12], the sizes of computer files (such as the
email address books) [13, 14], the sizes of earthquakes
[15], wars [16], craters on the moon [17] and solar flares
[18], the severity of worldwide terrorist attacks [19], the
number of species per genus of mammals [20], the num-
ber of sightings of birds of different species [21], the sales
of books [22], and music recordings [23, 24], etc.
As is well known, ranking is a very interesting and
ubiquitous phenomenon in the human society as every
one tends to seek the best. By clicking the web pages of
Forbes you can find all kinds of rankings, from world’s
most powerful people to world’s richest people, from top-
paid models to American’s top colleges, etc. Our inter-
est here is certainly not the gossip-like topic, but rather
whether there are some common patterns in the vastly
different ranking systems. Moreover, if yes, can we under-
stand the formalism of such patterns? To facilitate our
study we choose a specific kind of ranking systems, sports
2ranking, in which data are more suitable for analysis.
Here players’ performance in attending various competi-
tions will be used as the basis of their respective rankings,
in terms of scores and/or prize money. Amazingly we find
that the distributions of scores and/or prize money fol-
low universal power-laws, with exponents being nearly
identical for different sports fields. The universal scal-
ings can be reproduced by our model in which the key
mechanism is concerned with win-loss probability distri-
bution for any pair of players. This win-loss probability
distribution has been verified by the empirical data. Our
model is found to be robust with respect to the small
modifications of minor parts.
II. EMPIRICAL RESULTS OF SPORTS
RANKING SYSTEMS
To understand how a certain sports ranking system
works, let us take tennis as an example. ATP (Associa-
tion of Tennis Professionals) and WTA (Women’s Tennis
Association) are world’s most successful tennis associa-
tions for male and female professionals, respectively. To
appear on the ranking systems of ATP or WTA, the num-
ber of tournaments a player has to play should reach a
minimum, say 10. Tournaments have been divided into
several categories, such as grand slams, premier tourna-
ments, international tournaments and year-ending tour
championships, mainly based on the prize money. For
the most important tournaments such as grand slams,
the main draw only consists of 128 players. The entry
rule is that if you are top-ranked, then you have more
chances to attend the important tournaments. On the
other hand, players’ good performance will improve their
rankings which will in turn entitle them more chances to
play tournaments. Since there are so many tournaments
each year, for both ATP and WTA, the ranking list of
scores and of prize money vary from week to week. Here
we are not interested in which specific player is world
No.1 in certain sports, but instead the statistical dis-
tribution of performance, measured by scores and prize
money, of all the member players. What is the form of
such a distribution? Is it stable over different time peri-
ods? Is it universal?
Our data sets cover 12 different sports fields, such as
tennis, golf, snooker, and volleyball, etc. All the data are
updated up to February 2011. As the sample size of data
is small, we adopt the cumulative distribution to reduce
the potential statistical errors.
A. Cumulative distribution of scores
A player’s score or prize money is a direct measure of
his/her performance in various competitions. The higher
the score, the better the performance. The statistical
distribution of scores or prize money reflects the profile
of the performance of all the members belonging to the
same association. Every sports field has its own scoring
system, hence the orders of scores are not always at the
same level. In order to make the distributions of scores
or prize money comparable for different sports fields, we
rescale the quantities of interest. That is,
RS = S/Smax, (1)
where S denotes the values of quantities considered, e.g.,
scores or prize money, and Smax is the maximum value
of S in the sample, which pertains to the No. 1 player in
the ranking list by using S.
Cumulative distributions of players’ scores or prize
money have been shown in Fig. 1 for 12 different sports
ranking systems. Amazingly all the distributions share
very similar trend, which can be well fitted to the power-
law with an exponential cutoff as below,
P>(S) ∝ S
−τexp(−S/Sc), (2)
where τ and Sc are critical exponent and size cutoff, re-
spectively. It should also be noticed that for the same
field, all the curves collapse with each other. Values of
τ and Sc for different sports fields are given in Table 1,
where values of τ range from 0.01 to 0.39, and the coun-
terparts of Sc, from 0.12 to 0.28.
We employ the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test to
quantify how closely the power laws with exponential cut-
offs resemble the actual distributions of the observed sets
of samples. Based on the observed goodness of fit, the
p-value, which is defined to be the probability that the
real data are drawn from the hypothesized distribution,
is calculated for each set of sample. The p-values given
in Table 1 for the statistical significance test are all much
larger than 0.1, thereby we could conclude the power laws
with exponential cutoffs are reliable fits to the samples
of different sports ranking systems.
The evidence of the power-laws in the sports ranking
indicates that there is still significant probability to have
superman such as Roger Federer in tennis or Tiger Woods
in golf. But the prevalent probability is still the players
who do not play in the top form. Unlike the human height
system, it seems there is no typical player who plays with
average level. The power-laws found here are also differ-
ent from Zipf’s law in which the critical exponent is -1,
much larger than ours (in absolute value).
B. Pareto principle
The Pareto principle [25], also well known as the 80-20
rule, states that, for many events, roughly 80% of the ef-
fects comes from 20% of the causes. Pareto noticed that,
80% of Italy’s land was owned by 20% of the popula-
tion. He carried out such surveys on a variety of other
countries further, and to his surprise, the rule was also
fulfilled.
The 80-20 rule has also been used to attribute the
widening economic inequality, which showed that, the
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FIG. 1: Cumulative distributions of scores and prize money for 12 different sports fields. (a) Tennis: Association of Tennis
Professionals (ATP) and Women’s Tennis Association (WTA). (b) Golf: Professional Golfers’ Association (PGA) and Ladies
Professional Golf Association (LPGA). (c) Table tennis: International Table Tennis Federation (ITTF). (d) Volleyball: In-
ternational Federation of Volleyball (FIVB). (e) Football: International Federation of Football Association, commonly known
as FIFA. (f) Snooker: World Professional Billiards and Snooker Association (WPBSA). (g) Badminton: Badminton World
Federation (BWF). (h) Basketball: International Basketball Federation, more commonly known as FIBA. (i) Baseball: Inter-
national Baseball Federation (IBAF). (j) Hockey: International Field Hockey Federation (FIH). (k) Handball: International
Handball Federation (IHF). (l) Fencing: International Fencing Federation (FIE). All the curves can be fitted to power laws
with exponential cutoff, P>(S) ∝ S
−τexp(−S/Sc), where τ is the critical exponent and Sc is the size cutoff (the turning point).
The values of τ and Sc for different sports fields are provided in Table 1.
distribution of global income to be very uneven, with the
richest 20% of the world’s population controlling 82.7%
of the world’s income. The 80-20 rule could be applied
to many systems, from the science of management to the
physical world.
We also check this rule in the sports ranking systems,
it is interesting to find that, 20% players indeed possess
approximately 80% scores or prize money of the whole
system, the ratios we got in different sports ranking sys-
tems are shown in Table. 1, values of the ratios are all
very close to 0.8.
C. Dependence of win probability on ∆ rank
Here we employ the concept of ”win probability” to
describe the chances that a player or a team will win
when encountering an opponent. For instance, what is
4TABLE I: System sizes of 40 samples in the 12 different sports
ranking systems, values of the critical exponent τ and size
cutoff Sc in the power law with exponential cutoff, p-values
for the statistical significance test, and the ratio of the Pareto
principle test.
Sports ranking systems Sizes τ Sc p
a ratiob
ATP Single 1763 0.31 0.12 0.65 0.79
ATP Double 1516 0.32 0.18 0.52 0.78
ATP Prize Money 1636 0.33 0.13 0.56 0.79
WTA Single 1523 0.39 0.15 0.62 0.78
WTA Double 1028 0.38 0.19 0.75 0.80
WTA Prize Money 1388 0.39 0.12 0.81 0.81
PGA Score 1323 0.16 0.18 0.85 0.82
LPGA Score 734 0.18 0.19 0.82 0.78
PGA Average Score 1323 0.16 0.19 0.76 0.79
LPGA Average Score 734 0.17 0.20 0.82 0.82
ITTF Prize Money Men 1717 0.32 0.17 0.85 0.83
ITTF Prize Money Women 1288 0.32 0.18 0.73 0.82
FIVA Junior Men 105 0.16 0.21 0.86 0.76
FIVA Junior Women 95 0.14 0.20 0.68 0.79
FIVA Senior Men 138 0.13 0.16 0.69 0.78
FIVA Senior Women 127 0.11 0.18 0.92 0.82
FIFA Men 209 0.01 0.19 0.59 0.77
WPBSA Total Score 97 0.11 0.27 0.69 0.83
WPBSA Average Score 97 0.13 0.25 0.58 0.78
BWF Women Single 548 0.12 0.16 0.68 0.80
BWF Women Double 295 0.13 0.18 0.53 0.78
BWF Men Single 833 0.06 0.17 0.62 0.82
BWF Men Double 429 0.08 0.13 0.75 0.81
BWF Mixed Double 407 0.07 0.14 0.63 0.79
FIBA Men 79 0.19 0.20 0.86 0.81
FIBA Women 72 0.18 0.21 0.98 0.83
FIBA Boys 77 0.18 0.23 0.62 0.82
FIBA Girls 72 0.26 0.22 0.85 0.76
FIBA Combined 115 0.23 0.20 0.52 0.81
IBAF Men 78 0.20 0.28 0.96 0.79
FIH Men 73 0.23 0.26 0.86 0.78
FIH Women 68 0.21 0.27 0.83 0.81
IHF Men 52 0.16 0.25 0.68 0.79
IHF Women 46 0.15 0.27 0.69 0.76
FIE Sabre Senior Women 371 0.34 0.25 0.56 0.81
FIE Foil Senior Women 260 0.32 0.23 0.65 0.78
FIE Epee Senior Women 293 0.36 0.24 0.53 0.83
FIE Sabre Senior Men 319 0.32 0.23 0.67 0.78
FIE Foil Senior Men 337 0.30 0.21 0.56 0.82
FIE Epee Senior Men 442 0.28 0.25 0.72 0.81
aP-value of Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) test for the cumulative
scores or prize money distributions, with hypothesized distribution
being the power law with exponential cutoff.
bValues of the ratio for the test of Pareto principle.
the odds that a No.1 player will top a No.100 player?
What is again her chance against No.2? Theoretically,
the chance is much higher in the former case than in the
latter one. But the result of a competition is not un-
known until it is over, which mainly depends on how the
player performs at that specific match. However, the win
probability could be solely based on the previous perfor-
mance of a player against a certain opponent, which then
can used to predict her future performance against the
same opponent. This might have some applications in
betting the result of a match. To simplify the case with-
out loss of generality, we relate the win probability solely
to the rank difference of a pair of players. Suppose we
now have two players A and B, with A having a higher
rank. We will then need to know how likely A can beat
B when they meet? This quantity is related to but dif-
ferent from the win percentage we usually refer to. The
win percentage depicts the percentage of win of a player
over all previous encounters. We assume that the win
probability only depends on the rank difference between
two players. This means, the probability that No.1 beats
No.100 is the same as the one that No.100 beats No.200.
Hence, we have the following definition,
Pwin(∆r) =
Nwin(∆r)
Ntotal(∆r)
, (3)
where ∆r denotes the rank difference (integer), Nwin(∆r)
is the total number of win for the higher-ranked players
when the rank difference is ∆r, and Ntotal(∆r) is the
total number of matches in which the rank difference be-
tween the pair is ∆r. We here emphasize again that the
win probability is the probability that the higher-ranked
player will win when two players meet. When ∆r is small,
say 1, it is difficult to judge which player will win, and in
this case Pwin might approximately equal 0.5. When ∆r
is large, for instance 100, Pwin might approach 1, which
means the higher-ranked player is very likely to win.
By using the Head to Head records of ATP and WTA,
we find that the dependence of Pwin on ∆r can be well
fitted to the sigmoidal function as follows,
Pwin =
1
1 + exp(−a ∗∆r)
, (4)
where a is a parameter dependent on the specific systems.
For ATP and WTA, a is 0.021 and 0.032, respectively.
The existence of fluctuations is quite natural since even
Roger Federer will not win all the matches. The value of
a can still tell us some information about how compet-
itive that certain sports is. The smaller a is, the more
competitive the sports will be. Let us take WTA and
ATP as two examples. When ∆r is 30, the win probabil-
ity for WTA is nearly 0.7, while the counterpart for ATP
is 0.65. This means the game is more unpredictable in
ATP than in WTA. It is not strange since men’s game
is more competitive than women’s. We of course wish
to test the empirical finding by checking data from other
sports fields, but not so many data are available as far as
we know. Despite this, this finding will play a key role
in our model to follow.
III. A SIMPLE TOY MODEL OF SPORTS
RANKING SYSTEMS
What is the origin of the universal scaling in differ-
ent sports systems? Of course, there have been so many
approaches which can explain the origin of power-laws.
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FIG. 2: Dependence of win probability on ∆r of the players
for ATP and WTA, which can be well fitted to the sigmoidal
function Pwin = 1/(1 + exp(−a ∗∆r)).
Some mechanisms or theories are elegant, e.g., random
walks [2], self-organized criticality (SOC) [26], etc. It
is, however, difficult to try to apply these frameworks
to sports ranking systems. We propose a simple toy
model, inspired by tennis. Of course, the model may
not suit any sports field but does have some general im-
plications. Most importantly, our model can reproduce
robust power-laws without having to introduce additional
parameters.
253831651225610386
Champion
12 278961626712636457
FIG. 3: A cartoon of a draw sample. After each round, half
players will be eliminated, the numbers ”12, 86 ...” denote the
ranks of the players.
The rules of the model are defined in the following way,
(1) 2N players are ranked from 1 to 2N , being assigned
random scores drawn from a Gaussian distribution.
(2) For each tournament, all the players have entry
permission. Therefore the draw will include 2N players
and in total N rounds. At each round, half of the players
will be eliminated when they lose. The rest will enter the
next round. The losers at round n will gain score 2(n−1).
The final champion wins score 2N .
(3) The key mechanism is to decide which one will
lose for a given pair of players. Here our empirical find-
ing will be employed. Namely, when two players meet,
the probability that the higher-ranked player will top the
lower-ranked opponent is given by 1/(1+ exp(−a ∗∆r)),
where ∆r is their rank difference, as before.
(4) A new tournament opens up and a new draw is
made.
In principle, there is only one parameter in our model,
that is a. We can simply call it competition strength.
Of course, there are some shortcomings in the model.
First, in the actual tournaments not all the players will
be accepted. In grand slams there are only 128 players.
Second, tournaments can be divided into many categories
and may consist of different players. Third, the scoring
systems for different tournaments are a little different.
For grand slams the scores and prize money are much
higher than other tournaments, if the players are elim-
inated at the same round. We certainly can add these
issues into our model in order to test the resilience of
the model. At the moment we do not wish to complicate
the model by introducing additional parameters. What
we need here is a skeleton which may allow us to under-
stand some key features of the specific systems. Namely,
if the power-laws with exponential cutoffs can be repro-
duced through our model, then it is a feasible model. We
need not to care about other minor issues.
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FIG. 4: Cumulative distribution of scores from the simulation.
For these two samples, number of players Np = 2048, and
number of total tournaments Nt = 128, with Pwin = 1/(1 +
exp(−a ∗∆r)), a = 0.032 and 0.021, respectively.
6IV. SIMULATION RESULTS AND
DISCUSSIONS
The most important parameter in our model is a, the
so-called competition strength. The number of players
Np and the number of tournaments Nt only have finite-
size effects. It is natural to check the dependence of the
simulation results on these parameters, which can reflect
the resilience of our model.
First of all, we need to test whether the model can
reproduce the power-laws of the cumulative distribution
of scores. In Fig. 4, Np equals 2048, and Nt is 128, while
win probability, Pwin = 1/(1 + exp(−a ∗∆r)), with a =
0.021 and 0.032, as given by the empirical data of ATP
and WTA, respectively. We find that, the cumulative
distributions of scores given by the simulations indeed
follow the power-law distributions with exponential cut-
off, P (S) ∝ S−τexp(−S/Sc), with τ = 0.2, 0.22, Sc =
0.23, 0.19, respectively for these two samples. Here we
notice that the values of the parameters are very close to
what are obtained from the experimental data.
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FIG. 5: Influence of the critical parameter a on the final cu-
mulative scores distributions, values of a ranging from 0.0001
to 2.0.
In the formula of win probability, smaller values of
a correspond to more intensive competition. For in-
stance, when a = 0.0001, Pwin 6 0.525 for ∆r 6 1000,
which means higher-ranked player only has slightly more
chances than the lower-ranked player to win the match
between them. While larger values of a suggest that
the higher ranked players would win the match with a
much larger probability. For example, when a = 2.0,
Pwin > 0.88 for ∆rank > 1.
Thus here, to analyze the influence of win probabil-
ity, we simulated our models with different values of a,
0.0001 6 a 6 2.0. From Fig. 5, we can find that the cu-
mulative scores distributions change from the power laws
with exponential cutoff to exponential. Since when a is
very small, such as a = 0.0001, all players nearly win the
match randomly, thus the cumulative probabilities of the
scores approximately like 1, 1/2, (1/2)2, ..., which results
the exponential format.
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FIG. 6: Simulation result of the cumulative scores distribu-
tions for different number of tournaments, with Nt=64, 128,
and 256.
For different number of tournaments, Nt = 64, 128 and
256, the cumulative distributions of scores are shown in
Fig. 6, as seen, one could discover, all the cumulative
distributions of scores are power- laws with exponential
cutoff, values of the critical exponents τ and size cutoff
Sc are also very close to those of the empirical results.
In statistical physics, in order to determine the valid-
ity of the statistical approach, we often take the thermo-
dynamic limit, in which the number of components N
tends to infinity [27]. However, in real world networks,
the number of vertices or agents can never be that large,
this makes the factor of finite size of paramount impor-
tance. For example, even the largest artificial net, the
World Wide Web, whose size will soon approach 1011
Web pages, also shows qualitatively strong finite-size ef-
fects [28].
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FIG. 7: Finite size effects analysis of the simulation results,
Np=512, 1024, 2048 and 4096.
Therefore, here, in order to test the influence of the
finite size effect on the final cumulative scores distribu-
tion, we considered the transformed score distribution
P (S)∗Sτ versus S/Sc, where Sc is the characteristic size
cutoff. For four different system sizes, such relationships
were shown in Fig. 7, which suggest that, the tails of the
7four curves almost collapsed with each other, thereby, we
can conclude the finite size effect is almost negligible.
V. CONCLUSION
In summary, to characterize the intrinsic common fea-
tures and underline dynamics of ranking systems, we
carry out the investigations in an applicable and specific
kind of ranking systems, the sports ranking systems, the
main results are: (i) The universal scaling law is exten-
sively found in the distributions of scores and/or prize
money, in addition, values of the critical exponents are
close to each other for 40 samples of 12 sports ranking
systems. (ii) Players’ scores are discovered to obey the
Pareto principle, which means, 20% of players approxi-
mately possess 80% of total scores of the whole system.
(iii) Win probability is introduced to describe the chance
that a player or a team will win when meeting an oppo-
nent, we simply relate the win probability solely to the
rank difference ∆r, for tennis sport, the win probability
has been empirically verified to follow the sigmoid func-
tion, Pwin = 1/(1 + exp(−a ∗∆r)). (iv) By employing
the empirical features of win probability, we proposed
a simple toy model to simulate the real process of the
sports systems, the universal scaling could be well repro-
duced by our model, moreover, this result is robust when
we change the values of parameters in the model.
We are expecting to find such similar scaling laws in
other ranking systems, and we hope all these results and
methods could be well applied to analyzing any type of
paired competitions, or solving some practical problems
in the ranking systems.
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